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NOTE
FAMILIAL CONSENT FOR REGISTERED
ORGAN DONORS: A LEGALLY
REJECTED CONCEPTt
Kristin Cook
INTRODUCTION
Thousands of Americans are waiting for lifesaving transplants.' In
December 2002, Ora Frisby, a Philadelphia resident desperately in
need of such a transplant, got the second chance at life that comes to
only a few.2 Ms. Frisby, only fifty-three years old and a grandmother
of five, was suffering from agonizing dialysis treatments and the bleak
reality that her life was nearing its end.3 After four and a half years,
and thanks to one Philadelphia resident who donated a vital organ
after death, Ms. Frisby received the kidney transplant she needed.4
Due to this "gift of life," Ms. Frisby's prognosis is now a "long[,]
healthy life with her family."'
Unfortunately, many of those in need of an organ transplant are
not as fortunate as Ms. Frisby.6 The number of needed transplants far
t Awarded the first Health Matrix: Journal of Law-Medicine Outstanding
Student Note Award, as selected by the Volume 16 Editorial Board.
J.D. Candidate 2007, Case Western Reserve University School of Law;
B.A. 2003, The University of Texas at Austin. I would like to thank Professor Jessie
Hill for her guidance in writing this Note. I would also like to thank Colin
McLaughlin for his support throughout law school and the writing process.
1 Donate Life, http://www.organdonor.gov/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2006) (stat-
ing that approximately 92,000 people are waiting for an organ transplant).
Gift of Life Donor Program; Organ Donor Program Leads Nation in
Number of Transplants, BIOTECH WK., Feb. 12, 2003, at 65, 65.
Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, http://www.optn
.org (last visited Sept. 8, 2006) (follow "View Data Reports" hyperlink under "Data";
then follow "National Data" hyperlink; then choose category "Waiting List Remov-
als" and choose organ "All"; then follow "Death Removals by State by Year" hyper-
link) (providing national data on the transplant candidate waiting list and removals
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exceeds the number of organs recovered from organ donors, and, con-
sequently, many deaths occur while waiting for an organ transplant.7
The number of registered organ donors could be adequate to meet
demand,8 but many organs are not harvested from these organ donors
because their families fail to give their consent.9 Without familial con-
sent, medical professionals are extremely reluctant to remove organs
due to fear of lawsuits against them by a decedent's disgruntled fam-
ily.10
This Note argues that donor registrations should be respected be-
cause failing to honor an organ donor's wishes is illegal and immoral.
Hence, familial consent should not be sought in this context." Part I
of this Note lays out the current state of organ donation, discussing the
need for organ donors, the reality that familial consent is made para-
from the list due to deaths).
7 See id.; Donate Life, supra note 1.
8 "Each year in the United States, approximately 15,000 people die under
conditions that make them medically suitable potential organ donors." Golden State
Donor Services, It's About Giving Life, http://www.gsds.org/newsroom/statsfacts
.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2006). A single donor can supply up to eight organs for
transplantation (intestine, two lungs, liver, two kidneys, pancreas, and heart), so if
organs were procured from every person who died each year under conditions making
them suitable for organ donation, 120,000 transplants could take place. Id. Obviously,
not all of these people would have registered as organ donors, but the number regis-
tered is enough to come close to meeting, or actually meeting, the approximately
92,000 organs transplants needed each year. Donate Life, supra note 1. See Gift of
Life Donor Program, Philadelphia Region Leads Nation in Number of Organ Donors
2003, http://www.donorsl.org/news/2003_numbers.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2006)
(stating that over forty-eight percent of registered drivers in Delaware have registered
as organ donors); Gina Kolata, Organ Shortage Clouds New Transplant Era, 221
SCIENCE 32, 33 (1983) (referring to a Gallup poll in which "70 percent of Americans
said they were willing to donate their organs").
9 Jeffrey M. Prottas, Organ Procurement in Europe and the United States,
63 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 94, 101 (1985) (stating that an organ procurement
agency will not procure organs against the wishes of the deceased's next of kin even
if the deceased has a signed organ donor card); Golden State Donor Services, supra
note 8 (asserting that "next-of-kin will be consulted before donation takes place" and
that "the refusal rate among families of potential donors nationwide is around 50
percent").
10 Leonard H. Bucklin, Woe unto Those Who Request Consent: Ethical and
Legal Considerations in Rejecting a Deceased's Anatomical Gift Because There Is No
Consent By Survivors, 78 N.D. L. REv. 323, 339 (2002) (indicating that fear of being
sued by the family for not seeking their consent is a major reason physicians consis-
tently do seek consent); Kolata, supra note 8, at 33 (stating that "physicians fear that
if they suggest that the patient's organs be removed, the family may later sue").
I This Note means to argue that familial consent should not be sought when
the deceased is a registered organ donor. The issue of whether familial consent should
be sought when the deceased is not a registered organ donor is beyond the scope of
this Note.
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mount to the decedent's wishes,12 and the fact that the basis for this
practice is the medical profession's fear of lawsuits brought by surviv-
ing family members. 13 Part II discusses the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act (UAGA) and its provisions, which make it illegal to ask for a
family's permission to procure organs when the deceased is a regis-
tered organ donor.14
The UAGA, as adopted in every state,' 5 provides that familial
consent should not be sought when the decedent is a registered do-
nor,16 but the current practice in the medical profession is to disregard
this aspect of the UAGA. 17 Therefore, Part III goes further to suggest
that the practice of disregarding donors' wishes is also illegal on con-
tract grounds because a valid contract exists between a donor and an
Organ Procurement Organization (OPO). On the theory that an organ
donor card is a valid contract, Part III also proposes one solution for
medical professionals who are faced with litigation from a registered
organ donor's family-a countersuit against the family for tortious
interference with a contract. This will not relieve physicians of the
time burden and stress that accompanies litigation, but at least physi-
cians could attain some recovery in this way.
Furthermore, Part IV argues that donor registrations should be re-
spected because there is no legitimate threat of litigation against the
medical profession for following donors' wishes since any action
brought would lack merit. If a physician procures organs from a regis-
tered organ donor, and the family objects because their consent was
not sought, there is nothing for the physician to fear because the
UAGA grants immunity in such circumstances. 18 Additionally, Part
IV will address the insufficiency of a property conversion claim or an
emotional distress claim brought by a decedent's family against a
medical professional.
12 See generally Bucklin, supra note 10.
13 Id.
"4 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(h) (1987) (stating that familial consent
should not be sought when the decedent is a registered donor).
15 Every state has adopted some form of the UAGA. UNIF. ANATOMICAL
GIFT ACT 1987 Refs & Annos (West, Westlaw 2003 Main Volume). This Note will
use the term "UAGA" to refer to the model act but, for simplicity, will also use
"UAGA" to refer collectively to states' anatomical gift acts.
16 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(h).
17 Bucklin, supra note 10, at 324-25 ("One survey found only four states take
advantage of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) provisions by retrieving
organs solely on the authority of a donor document.").
18 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(h).
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Part V will address the moral context by pointing out society's
emphasis on autonomy.1 9 That Part will discuss how the importance of
autonomy in the organ donor setting can be analogized to judicial
affirmation of autonomy as key in the issue of informed consent and
in the use of advance directives.
The Conclusion summarizes these points and discusses the reality
of the medical profession avoiding litigation in this context.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF ORGAN DONATION
The current state of organ donation is clearly inadequate. Ap-
proximately 90,000 people are waiting for organ transplants, yet very
few actually receive them. 20 An estimated seventy-four people receive
an organ transplant each day, but this is countered by the fact that
another seventeen die every day while waiting for transplants.2
Hence, the removal of a significant number of names from the trans-
plant waiting list is not due to people having obtained transplants but
is instead due to deaths of many who are waiting. To date, 65,978
Americans have been removed from the transplant waiting list be-
cause they died before receiving the necessary organ or tissue trans-
plant.22 Thus, the shortage of organs available for transplantation is a
major problem.
It is estimated that the number of prospective donors each year
would be sufficient to satisfy demand if organs were in fact harvested
from those donors. 23 Because multiple organs and tissues can be har-
vested from a single donor, that single donor can save several lives.24
In 2005, for instance, 21,212 transplants were performed as a result of
organ and tissue recovery from only 7,593 deceased donors. Clearly,
19 See MARSHA GARRISON & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF BIOETHICS:
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL REGULATION 27 (2003) (stating that "the central
principle of American bioethics is autonomy").
20 Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Data, http://www.optn
.org/data/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2006) (showing a breakdown of the number of trans-
plants needed for specific organs); Donate Life, supra note 1.
21 Donate Life, supra note 1.
22 Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, supra note 6.
23 Bucklin, supra note 10, at 324. A 1983 Gallup poll found that seventy
percent of Americans are willing to be organ donors. Kolata, supra note 8, at 33.
24 See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, supra note 6.
25 See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Multiple Trans-
plants, http://www.optn.org (last visited Sept. 8, 2006) (follow "View Data Reports"
hyperlink under "Data"; then follow "National Data" hyperlink; then choose category
"Transplant" and choose organ "All"; then follow "Deceased Donor Transplants by
State" hyperlink); Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, http://www.optn
.org (last visited Sept. 8, 2006) (follow "View Data Reports" hyperlink under "Data";
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organ demand could even be exceeded if all potential donations were
obtained every year, but that is far from the reality.26
The primary reason that many organ donations are not harvested
is because the medical profession fears lawsuits from decedents' sur-
viving next of kin for harvesting organs without familial consent.27
Hence, the medical profession regularly makes familial consent para-
mount to the decedent's wishes in the context of organ donation.28
Although most people assume that registering as an organ donor will
ensure that their wishes will be respected at the time of their death,
that is not the case.29 In actuality, it is the decedent's next of kin who
generally determine whether the decedent's organs may be procured,
even if the decision is contrary to the decedent's written directive.
30
Though a decedent may be a registered organ donor, it is likely that no
then follow "National Data" hyperlink; then choose category "Donor" and choose
organ "All"; then follow "Deceased Donors by State of DSA" hyperlink) (compare
the 2005 totals for "All States").
26 See Kolata, supra note 8, at 33 (stating that most doctors want to secure
consent from families before participating in organ procurement).
27 Id. (stating that doctors "want to obtain the consent of the families before
going ahead and referring patients as organ donors" and indicating that one reason
doctors do not make an effort to procure organs for transplantation is "fear of legal
reprisals"). See generally Daniel G. Jardine, Comment, Liability Issues Arising out of
Hospitals' and Organ Procurement Organizations' Rejection of Valid Anatomical
Gifts: The Truth and Consequences, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1655 (1990) (discussing the
medical profession's practice of allowing familial wishes to trump the wishes of
deceasedpotential organ donors).
28Thomas D. Overcast et al., Problems in the Identification of Potential
Organ Donors: Misconceptions and Fallacies Associated with Donor Cards, 251
JAMA 1559, 1561-62 (1984). See Press Release, Gift of Hope, Lives to be Saved
Through New Illinois Law Honoring Individuals' Wishes to Become Organ/Tissue
Donors (July 6, 2005), available at http://www.giftofhope.org/newsroom/
news-releases/2005/New%20Illinois%201aw%206%2005.pdf (stating that "about
19% of potential donors enrolled as a 'yes' in the Illinois organ/tissue donor registry
each year have had their intent overruled by family members," and, "[a]s a result, the
individual's wishes to donate are not honored and opportunities to save lives through
transplantation are lost" (internal quotations omitted)).
29 See generally THE HASTINGS CTR., ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
PERTAINING TO ORGAN PROCUREMENT: A REPORT OF THE PROJECT ON ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION (1985) [hereinafter HASTINGS CENTER REPORT] (finding that many
who have registered as organ donors do not have that desire respected after their death
when surviving next of kin does not consent to the donation).
30 Elizabeth McKenny & Bridgette Parker, Legal and Ethical Issues Related
to Nonheart Beating Organ Donation, 77 AORN J. 973, 974 (2003) (stating that
"most hospitals currently rely on surrogate consent from family members" whether or
not there is a donor card). See generally Jardine, supra note 27; Medical Update:
Organ Donors Must Pipe Up, CONSUMER REP. ON HEALTH, Nov. 1993, at 126 (stating
that, in the context of organ donation, "the final decision is generally left to the clos-
est surviving relatives, even if the would-be donor left written instructions").
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organs will be harvested from that cadaver.3 Reports show that when
next of kin are available and oppose donation, only twelve percent of
Organ Procurement Offices (OPOs) are likely to procure based on a
donor card or comparable document, 32 and less than twenty-five per-
cent of medical professionals said they would proceed with organ
procurement in situations where a family member could not be lo-
cated, despite the presence of a written directive.33 Another study de-
termined that thirty-one percent of OPOs follow the decedent's
wishes, thirty-one percent follow the next of kin's wishes, and twenty-
one percent procure organs only if neither party objects.34 Essentially,
a donor's gift, evidenced by a written directive such as a donor card,
is almost always refused unless that gift is ratified by the decedent's
next of kin. 35 Such failure by physicians to respect donor cards and
treat the cards as binding legal documents often makes an attempt to
become an organ donor futile.
36
Hospitals, after all, have an incentive to satisfy the surviving fam-
ily members because the survivors will be the ones providing future
business and good will to the hospital. Refusing to harvest organs
without familial consent, irrespective of whether the decedent had a
donor card, allows hospitals to keep from losing future business and
to avoid costly litigation brought by a family member who may op-
pose the procurement.37 Consequently, even if it is conceded that the
authority to donate lies with the decedent, medical professionals view
legal accountability to living family members as a far greater threat
than liability to the deceased. Such a formidable threat of litigation
allows for familial veto power over the decedent's written directive.
38
The medical profession's fear of litigation is understandable con-
sidering the number of malpractice claims brought each year,39 but the
31 See generally Jardine, surpra note 27.
32 Dave Wendler & Neil Dickert, The Consent Process for Cadaveric Organ
Procurement: How Does It Work? How Can It Be Improved?, 285 JAMA 329, 329
(2001).
13 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, supra note 29, at 14.
34 Wendler & Dickert, supra note 32, at 329.
35 Organ Donation, POSTGRADUATE MED., Jan. 2004, at 67, 68 (indicating
that doctors will not even consider organ donation unless the family agrees); Prottas,
supra note 9, at 100-01.
36 Ann M. Bazil & Bruce R. Goldberg, ISBA Moves to Eliminate Roadblocks
to Organ Donation and Transplantation, 73 ILL. B.J. 372, 373 (1985).
37 Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Personality: Toward Property
Right in the Human Bodies, 69 TEx. L. REv. 209, 224 (1990).
38 See generally Jardine, supra note 27.
39 See David Steves, Oregon Measure's Malpractice Awards Cap Sharply
Divides Medical Professionals, REG.-GUARD, Oct. 3, 2004, at Al (stating that the
American Medical Association considers twenty states to be "in crisis" regarding
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following sections of this Note will argue that fear of litigation is
largely unfounded because no legitimate causes of action exist. Not
only will medical professionals who procure organs from a decedent
who has a written directive establishing the desire to donate not be
subject to liability, but they are actually acting illegally and unethi-
cally in failing to procure such organs.
II. ILLEGALITY OF SEEKING FAMILIAL CONSENT
UNDER THE UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT
(UAGA)
The UAGA makes it illegal to seek familial consent when a dece-
dent is a registered organ donor.40 All fifty states and the District of
Columbia have adopted some form of the UAGA,4 1 which, among
other things, specifically provides that "an anatomical gift that is not
revoked by the donor before death is irrevocable and does not require
the consent or concurrence of any person after the donor's death.
' 42
The UAGA also includes an immunity provision for medical profes-
sionals acting in good faith when removing organs, and courts have
consistently granted hospitals and physicians protection under this
provision.43 As this Note will lay out in the following sections, these
provisions should relieve any anxieties medical professionals may
have about proceeding in accordance with a donor's wishes without
gaining consent from the donor's next of kin.44
medical malpractice insurance costs); C. Paul Wazzan, An Economic Assessment of
Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice Litigation Imposed by State Laws and the
Implications for Federal Policy and Law, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 693, 698 (stating that
"expenses related to malpractice liability ... totaled approximately $27 billion na-
tionwide" in 2003). In 2004, the average payment per medical malpractice claim was
between $124,747 and $655,767, depending on the state. Id. at 705-06.
40 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(h) (1987).
41 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT 1987 Refs & Annos (West, Westlaw 2003
Main Volume).42 This provision protects medical professionals by making clear that familial
consent should not be sought when the decedent is an organ donor. UNIF.
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(h).
43 Id. § 11 (c); see Rahman v. Mayo Clinic, 578 N.W.2d 802, 806-07 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1998) (upholding summary judgment for clinic and doctors in an action
against them seeking damages for retaining the decedent's pelvic block because the
defendants acted in good faith and made an honest attempt to comply with the dece-
dent's wishes); see also Callsen v. Cheltenham York Nursing Home, 624 A.2d 663,
665 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (requiring an evidentiary showing of "good faith" by
hospital and nursing facility to qualify for immunity when relevant facts are con-
tested).
44 Though the UAGA requires medical professionals not to seek permission
from a decedent's next of kin for procuring his or her organs if the decedent is a regis-
HEALTH MA TRIX
A. Overview of the UAGA
The UAGA was originally promulgated in 1968 but was revised
in 1987. 45 According to the Hastings Center Report, the purpose of the
1987 UAGA was to deal with the inadequacies in the system of organ
donation, including "[f]ailure on the part of medical personnel to re-
cover organs on the basis of written directives. 'A6 That report found
that making familial consent paramount to decedents' wishes is a key
problem hindering organ donation.47 Hence, the 1987 UAGA specifi-
cally states that familial consent is not required if the decedent made
an anatomical gift.48 In fact, it states that next of kin should not be
consulted in such a situation.49
Also significant in the 1987 UAGA is that no witnesses are re-
quired to have observed the document of the gift.50 The Act defines a
"document of gift" as "a card, a statement attached to or imprinted on
a motor vehicle operator's or chauffeur's license, a will, or other
writing used to make an anatomical gift. '51 Therefore, a decedent's
next of kin cannot claim that a donor card is invalid due to no witness
being present at the time of its signing.
Furthermore, the UAGA provides an immunity provision for
medical professionals acting in good faith.52 This provision gives all
medical professionals an affirmative defense in a suit brought by a
next of kin for removing organs from a registered organ donor. In
other words, even if all of a plaintiffs allegations of procurement
without familial consent are true, a medical professional's assertion of
tered organ donor, it does not provide any causes of action for its violation. UNIF.
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(h). Additionally, no state anatomical gift acts provide any
such causes of action. See generally UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT 1987 Refs &
Annos (West, Westlaw 2003 Main Volume). Accordingly, rather than discussing how
medical professionals could be held liable for failing to respect donor registrations,
this Note's main focus is on why medical professionals should not be afraid to respect
donor registrations, even absent familial consent, and that they have a moral obliga-
tion to respect donor registrations.
45 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT 1987 Refs & Annos (West, Westlaw 2003
Main Volume).
46 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, supra note 29, at 15.
41 Id. at 15-16.
48 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(h) (1987).
49 Id. ("An anatomical gift that is not revoked by the donor before death is
irrevocable and does not require the consent or concurrence of any person after the
donor's death.").
50 Id. § 2(b).
51 Id. § 1(3).
52 Id. § 1 (c). See infra Part IV.A.
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good faith prevents the plaintiff from having a valid case.53 This im-
munity will be discussed further in Part IV A.
The UAGA does not provide any causes of action for its violation,
but it instead serves as statutory protection for medical professionals
who adhere to donor registrations. Its provisions make clear that
medical professionals should not ask a donor's next of kin for permis-
sion before harvesting the donor's organs.54 Therefore, a lawsuit
brought by a next of kin for such action would be unsuccessful.
B. Adoption of UAGA Provisions by States
The UAGA has been adopted in full or with minor modifications
by every state and the District of Columbia. 55 Therefore, donor regis-
tration should be treated as legally binding in every state. There is no
state in which medical professionals would not be protected by their
respective state's anatomical gift act, so failing to adhere to its provi-
sions should not be excused due to fear of litigation.
New Mexico's Anatomical Gift Act, for example, even goes so
far to enforce the legally binding effect of donor registration by titling
one of its provisions "Document of gift as a legal document. '56 This
provision states that "a document of gift, which includes a motor ve-
hicle driver's license, constitutes a legal document and has sufficient
legal authority to be accepted. '57 Hence, medical professionals should
simply not fear lawsuits for removing organs from registered organ
donors in New Mexico. Of course, being sued is costly for defendants
even if the plaintiffs are not successful, 58 but, because New Mexico's
Anatomical Gift Act makes it clear that a plaintiff would not be suc-
cessful, it is unlikely that such a suit would be brought. Therefore,
medical professionals in that state should be quite comfortable remov-
ing organs from donors without consulting the donor's next of kin.
Illinois's Anatomical Gift Act differs from that of other states in
that it requires the presence of two witnesses for an anatomical gift
53 Black's Law Dictionary defines an affirmative defense as "[a] defendant's
assertion [of] . . . arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiffs or prosecution's
claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are true." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
186 (2nd Pocket ed. 2001).
54 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(h)(1987).
55 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, supra note 29, at 9.
56 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-6A-7.1 (West 2005).
57 id.
58 See Steves, supra note 39 (stating that malpractice insurance rates are so
high that many physicians are choosing to leave the field); Wazzan, supra note 39, at
698.
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made by a document other than a will.59 The Act also states that a
donation by a valid organ donor "shall take effect upon the individ-
ual's death without the need to obtain the consent of any survivor";
thus, even with the slight impediment to donation of requiring wit-
nesses, this Act, like others, does not require familial consent if the
decedent has validly registered as an organ donor.60 Further simplify-
ing Illinois's donation process is the fact that the witness requirement
only applies to registries made before January 1, 2006.61 After that
date, a written, signed document, such as a card or driver's license, is
"effective without regard to the presence or signature of witnesses.' '62
The wording of Illinois's Anatomical Gift Act evidences the in-
tent to make donor cards legally binding documents. The fact that this
Act's purpose includes recognition "that there is a critical shortage of
human organs and tissues available to citizens in need of organ and
tissue transplants" implies that the Act should be read as an instru-
ment intended to increase the supply of organ donations.63 Therefore,
it is apparent that both the Act's express wording and its intention
make donor registration legally binding. Like other states' anatomical
gift acts, Illinois's Act should alleviate medical professionals' appre-
hension in removing organs from donors, and, hence, next of kin
should not be consulted regarding harvesting of organs from a validly
registered organ donor in any state.
III. ILLEGALITY OF FAILING TO TREAT DONOR
CARDS AS VALID CONTRACTS 64
Even though the UAGA makes it illegal to disregard a donor's
wishes, the current practice continues to disregard these provisions.65
It is understandable that hospitals have an incentive to accommodate
the surviving family members' wishes rather than the decedent's
59 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/5-20(b) (2005), amended by 755 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 50/5-20(b) (2006) (changing the witness requirement in § 5-20(b)).60 Id. § 50/5-5(a).
61 Id. § 50/5-20(b) (amended 2005).
62 Id.; H.B. 1077, 94th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2005) (establishing
first person consent, meaning that organ donor cards are to be deemed valid regard-
less of whether witnesses were present at its signing).
63 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1-5 (2005) (stating that part of the Act's intent is
to facilitate organ donation within Illinois to those individuals who need them).
64 It could also be argued that online donor registrations and other forms of
registry are also valid contracts, but this Note focuses on the simpler example of
registration in the form of donor cards.
65 Organ Donation, supra note 35, at 68 (indicating that doctors will not
even consider organ donation unless the family agrees).
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wishes because, obviously, the decedent can not file suit.66 Even so,
this Part argues that there is support beyond the UAGA for respecting
donor registrations that makes acting in accord with decedents' wishes
more attractive to medical professionals. That support is the argument
that it is illegal to fail to treat a donor card as a legally binding docu-
ment because it is a valid contract.
The process by which one becomes an organ donor creates the
expectation that one is creating a legally binding document. Present in
the process of becoming an organ donor is an offer, an acceptance,
and consideration-the required elements of a contract. 67 Further-
more, potential organ donors are given adequate information to ensure
the contract's validity.
As this Part will also discuss, if there is an intended donee, that
person could be seen as a third party beneficiary to the contract.
Because a contract is created and there is a third party beneficiary,
medical professionals should respect donor registration and not fear
lawsuit. In fact, if the next of kin attempts to prevent the procurement,
that person is tortiously interfering with a contract and could be sued
on such grounds.
A. Process Creates Expectation of a Binding Document: Offer,
Acceptance, and Consideration
Through the process of becoming an organ donor, a potential do-
nor has an expectation that a binding obligation is created on the part
of OPOs to procure the donor's organs for transplantation. 68 A con-
tract is formed here because the parties have made a legally enforce-
able promise; that is, they have made "a commitment ... that a given
event will .. .occur in the future" through express and/or implied
language or conduct, and such promise "was made as part of a bargain
for valid consideration., 69 The parties to the contract are the potential
organ donor and the OPO.
70
66 A decedent's estate could bring a cause of action, but the estate in these
circumstances would likely consist of family members who did not want the dece-
dent's wishes adhered to in the first place.
67 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1979) (stating the elements
of a contract).
68 One survey "of public attitudes toward organ donation and transplanta-
tion" revealed that eighty percent of respondents believed an organ donor card should
be considered a legal document. Susan Evers et al., Public Awareness of Organ Do-
nation, 138 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 237, 237 (1988).
69 LEXISNEXIS, CONTRACTS CAPSULE SUMMARY § 1.01 (2004), http://
www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool/study/outlines/html/contracts01 .htm; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1979) (discussing valid consideration).
70 The OPOs act through an agent, such as an employee at a donor registry or
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The typical process for obtaining a driver's license includes a
question of whether the applicant wishes to become an organ donor.71
This question serves as an offer to a potential organ donor to harvest
his or her organs at the time of death so that they may be used for
transplantation. 2 Such an "offer" is the first step in creating a binding
contract. 73 If the offeree then answers with a yes, he or she is accept-
ing the offer.74 One online Illinois organ donor registry even points
out that if a "driver's license has a 'Y' under 'Organ Donor' or if a
driver's license applicant "told a driver services facility staff member
that [he or she] intend[s] to sign the donor portion" of the license, then
that applicant is validly in Illinois's donor registry. 75 Hence, appli-
cants have reason to believe that they are being made an offer and are
legally accepting it by saying yes.76
The offeror, in this context, is making an offer that will be carried
out through an OPO. 77 Because the offeror, who is most likely a De-
the attendant who asks a driver's license applicant if he or she would like to be an
organ donor.
71 Alabama statute requires "[tjhe following question in the following sub-
stantial form shall be asked of each applicant[:] . . . 'Do you wish to have the organ
donor designation printed on your driver's license?' ALA. CODE § 22-19-70 (Lex-
isNexis 2006). A reputable website states that Illinois residents can become organ
donors by calling the Illinois Organ/Tissue Donor Registry, by registering online, or
"by saying 'yes' when asked whether they want to enroll in the Illinois Organ/Tissue
Donor Registry as they receive or renew their driver's licenses at an Illinois driver's
license facility." Gift of Hope, First Person Consent, http://www.giftofhope.org/
First-Person-Consent/Illinois-organ-tissue-registry.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2006).72 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (stating that "[a]n offer is
the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another
person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude
it"); Southworth v. Oliver, 587 P.2d 994, 999 (Or. 1978) (holding that under all the
surrounding facts and circumstances, an offer has been made if a reasonable person in
the alleged offeree's position would have believed that an offer was being made).
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24; LEXIsNEXIS, supra note 69,
§ 2.01 ("Contract formation requires mutual assent ... by the parties, generally mani-
fested by an offer and acceptance.").
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24; LEXIsNExIs, supra note 69,
§ 3.01 ("An offer creates in the offeree the power to form a contract by an appropriate
acceptance."); see Maryland Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co., 369 A.2d 1017, 1023-24
(Md. 1977) (stating that the key to creating an offer is in giving the offeree the appar-
ent power to accept the contract).
75 CyberDrivelllinois, Illinois Organ/Tissue Donor Registry,
https://www .cyberdriveillinois.com/ContactFormsWeb/register.html (last visited Oct.
28, 2005).
76 See Maryland Supreme Corp., 369 A.2d at 1024-25; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 30 (1979) (stating that "an offer invites acceptance in any
manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances").
77 When someone registers as an organ donor, that registration is then avail-
able to OPOs, who will then procure the offeree's organs upon his or her death. The
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partment of Public Safety employee, 8 is in a legitimate position to
make such an offer and because potential organ donors have reason to
believe that they are creating a binding document, a positive response
to the offer should create a valid acceptance.89
The contract requirement of valid consideration is also met.80
Valid consideration requires a bargained-for exchange on behalf of
each party, which may consist of a forbearance. 81 A bargained-for
exchange exists because the offeror promises to ensure procurement
of the offeree's organs in exchange for the offeree's promise to allow
procurement and donation upon his or her death.82 Additionally, both
parties incur a forbearance by undertaking an action in which they
were not previously obligated to engage.83 Therefore, there is valid
consideration in the organ donor registration process, which com-
pletes the requirements for a legal contract and further legitimizes the
potential donors' perception of the creation of a binding document.
Parties to a contract must know the nature of the contract.8 4 The
parties, here, would presumably understand the contract they are cre-
ating because an abundance of information is communicated to poten-
tial organ donors detailing the organ donation process.85 Alabama, for
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Donation & Transplantation,
http://www.optn.org/about/transplantation/matchingProcess.asp (last visited Sept. 8,
2006) (describing the donation and transplantation process). See Dianne Carter-
Gentry & Cynthia McCurren, Organ Procurement from the Perspective of Periopera-
tive Nurses, 80 AORN J. 417, 417 (2004) (describing organ procurement as "the
process of removing (ie, harvesting) [sic] organs from a donor who is brain dead in
anticipation of implanting them into a waiting recipient").
78 In Alabama, for example, an employee at the Alabama Department of
Public Safety asks, "Do you wish to be an organ donor?" ALA. ORGAN CTR., DRIVER'S
LICENSE BROCHURE, available at http://www.uab.edu/aoc/drivers3.html. Illinois resi-
dents are also offered enrollment as an organ donor when they renew or receive their
driver's licenses at an Illinois Department of Public Safety facility. Gift of Hope,
Statistics & Information: Become a Donor, http://www.giftofhope.org/statistics
information/becomeadonor.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2006).
79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 30 (1979).
80 A contract generally requires consideration in order to be enforceable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Ch. 4 Introductory Note.
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (discussing valid consider-
ation).
82 Id. (discussing what constitutes a bargained-for exchange).
83 Id. (discussing what constitutes "forbearance").
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(1)(a) (stating that there can
be no mutual assent to the formation of a contract "if the parties attach materially
different meanings to their manifestations and neither party knows or has reason to
know the meaning attached by the other").
85 Many states give brochures at the Department of Public Safety offices.
Both the Alabama Driver's License Brochure and the Motorcycle Manual explain
what it means when one says "yes" when asked if he or she wants to be an organ
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example, requires by statute that a brochure be provided to a driver's
license applicant "explaining the method of expressing an intent to
make an anatomical gift."' 86 Furthermore, the abundance of states that
have provisions on driver's licenses for organ donation implies fa-
miliarity with the issue, the process, and the meaning of becoming an
organ donor.
87
In one survey of "public attitudes toward organ donation and
transplantation . . . 80% [of respondents] said that the organ donor
card should be considered a legal document., 88 Therefore, by their
own admission, potential organ donors are given adequate information
to enter into a valid contract. Moreover, courts have held that a con-
tract need not be read to be effective, indicating that full comprehen-
sion of a contract's terms is not required for its validity.89
B. Basis for Possible Countersuit Against Next of Kin for Tortious
Interference with a Contract
Although this Note argues that suits brought against medical pro-
fessionals for removing organs from a donor without obtaining
consent from the decedent's next of kin are not legitimate, such ille-
gitimacy does not prevent people from bringing them. If suits are
brought and consistently dismissed, people may begin to see the futil-
ity in suing. Until then, litigation, even if dismissed, will be costly and
time-consuming for medical professionals. Therefore, this Note sug-
gests that medical professionals go on the offensive and bring a coun-
donor. See ALA. ORGAN CTR., supra note 78; ALA. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY,
MOTORCYCLE OPERATOR MANUAL, available at http://www.dps.state.al.us/public/
driverlicense/manual/motorcyclemanual.pdf. Also, donor registries provide many
pages of information on the subject. See generally Gift of Hope, http://www.gift
oflope.org (last visited Sept. 8, 2006).
8 ALA. CODE § 22-19-71 (LexisNexis 2006). See ALA. ORGAN CTR., supra
note 78; ALA. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, MOTORCYCLE OPERATOR MANUAL supra note
85.
87 Traditionally, almost every state has had provisions on driver's licenses for
organ donation, so the longstanding nature of this process also supports the argument
that potential donors are adequately informed. Overcast et al., supra note 28, at 1560.
88 Evers et al., supra note 68, at 237.
89 See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
that terms sent in the box with a product stating that they govern the sale unless the
product is returned within 30 days are binding on a buyer who does not return the
product). In Hill, the buyer had reason to know what the terms indicated but simply
did not read them. Id. The terms of a contract are "operative in accordance with the
meaning attached to them by one of the parties if that party does not know of any
different meaning attached by the other, and the other knows the meaning attached by
the first party." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(2)(a) (1981) (explaining
the effect of misunderstanding in determining mutual assent).
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tersuit against petitioners suing them in this context. In a situation
where a decedent left a written directive indicating a wish to be an
organ donor and the decedent's next of kin brings a suit against medi-
cal professionals for harvesting organs, medical professionals can
respond with a countersuit alleging that the decedent's next of kin
tortiously interfered with a contract. 90 If an organ donor card is recog-
nized as a legally binding document, then there is no reason why an
action can not be brought for interfering with it. In this way, medical
professionals have some way to protect themselves against the ex-
pense of litigation because they may be able to recover monetarily
from their countersuit.
Furthermore, a designated organ recipient could also bring a cause
of action against a decedent's next of kin for tortious interference with
91 -92
a contract.9 An organ donor may designate an intended recipient,
and the designated recipient can be considered to be a third party
beneficiary to the contract between the organ donor and OPO. 93 That
recipient, as a third party beneficiary, has the power to enforce a con-
tract. 94 Therefore, if the next of kin tried to prohibit, or was successful
in prohibiting, the designated recipient from receiving an organ from
the decedent, then the next of kin is interfering with the performance
owed to the third party beneficiary.
If, on the other hand, there is no designated donee, it would be
difficult for an individual on the transplant waiting list to claim third
party beneficiary status. It would not be known to that individual that
90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979) ("One who intentionally
and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract ... between another and
a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the
contract, is subject to liability."). To have standing to sue, medical professionals
would probably have to somehow show that they were a party to the contract or argue
that they are a third party beneficiary to the contract.
91 The problem would be that, if the suit was brought after the family had
already prevented procurement of the organs, the designated recipient could only
recover monetarily. It would be too late for an injunction requiring procurement.
However, this Note is primarily concerned with deterrent effect, and such a suit
would serve that purpose.
92 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 5(e) (1987) (discussing intended donees).
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1981) (A "beneficiary
of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties" and "the circum-
stances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the
promised performance."). The UAGA states that, if the donor has specified an in-
tended donee, the donee should be notified at or near the time of the donor's death.
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 5(e).
94 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 ("A promise in a contract
creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and
the intended beneficiary may enforce the duty.").
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he or she would have received an organ transplant but for the dis-
missal of an organ donor card in favor of a family's wish that organs
not be harvested from the decedent.95 In theory, the individual could
sue the potential organ donor's family for interference with a contract,
but the logistics of such action are unclear. 96 It may be possible, how-
ever, for people waiting for transplants to bring a class action suit
against a hospital for tortious interference with a contract if it is clear
that that hospital's policy is to require familial consent before procur-
ing organs from even a registered organ donor..
IV. INSUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR SUIT AGAINST
MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS FOR RESPECTING
DONORS' WISHES
Setting aside the issue of illegality discussed above, donor regis-
trations should not be disregarded because there is no legitimate fear
of litigation for medical professionals since there are no adequate
causes of action to be brought. The following sections will discuss
protection against litigation for the medical profession; that is, protec-
tion afforded in cases of organ procurement where there is a donor
registration. In such instances, protection is granted because the
UAGA provides immunity, because the decedent's family lacks stand-
ing to bring a property conversion claim, and because the family lacks
adequate grounds to bring an emotional distress claim.
A. Immunity Under the UAGA
The UAGA and its adoption in various forms among states pro-
vide an explicit immunity provision for medical professionals acting
in good faith.97 The provision states that a medical professional who
acts in accordance with the UAGA "or attempts in good faith to do so
is not liable for that act in a civil action or criminal proceeding. 98
Courts have readily applied this immunity provision and held for
medical professionals in almost all cases where the medical profes-
95 There is no mechanism available for people waiting for organ transplants
to know that a registered organ donor has died and whether organs have been pro-
cured for transplantation from that decedent. Therefore, someone on the transplant
waiting list would never know that a registered organ donor had died but that the
decedent's organs had not been procured because medical professionals allowed the
decedent's next of kin to override the donor registration.
96 Because the prospective transplant recipient would not know who had died
and had their wishes overridden by family members, he or she would not know the
identity of the family member that could be sued for tortious interference.
97 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 1 l(c) (1987).
98 Id.
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sional's conduct could be considered to fall within the bounds of the
relevant state's anatomical gift act.99 The Alabama Supreme Court
recently failed to give protection to defendants through the Alabama
Anatomical Gift Act's immunity provision, but, as will be explained,
the facts of that case are such that the Court's holding does not
weaken the immunity provision for medical professionals who remove
organs from valid organ donors.
100
Courts have consistently applied immunity provisions laid out in
states' respective anatomical gift acts. In both Rahman v. Mayo
Clinic'°' and Callsen v. Cheltemham York Nursing Home, 12 medical
professionals were found not liable for removing organs from dece-
dents because the medical professionals' actions were made in good
faith. 0 3 In the former case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld
summary judgment for a clinic and doctors in an action against them
seeking damages for removing the plaintiffs son's pelvic block.'04 In
that case, the plaintiff agreed in writing that the treating physician
could remove organs and tissue from the plaintiffs son for purposes
of donation.10 5 Subsequently, the plaintiff added a restriction that the
removed organs were not to be used for educational or research pur-
poses, but the treating physician was unaware of this restriction be-
cause it was not included on the organ donation permission form.1
0 6
When the decedent's pelvic block was removed and used for educa-
tional purposes at the Mayo Medical School, the plaintiff brought suit
against the Mayo Clinic and the treating physician. 0 7 The court found
that, because the physician and clinic had acted in good faith, Minne-
99 See Rahman v. Mayo Clinic, 578 N.W.2d 802, 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)
(upholding summary judgment for clinic and doctors in an action against them
seeking damages for retaining the decedent's pelvic block because the defendants
acted in good faith and made an honest attempt to comply with the decedent's
wishes); Callsen v. Cheltenham York Nursing Home, 624 A.2d 663 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1993) (requiring an evidentiary showing of "good faith" by hospital and nursing
facility to qualify for immunity when relevant facts are contested).
1oo See George H. Lanier Mem'l Hosp. v. Andrews, 901 So. 2d 714, 721-23
(Ala. 2004) (refusing to grant statutory immunity to defendants, a hospital, and a
hospital employee because defendants failed to adhere to the statute's good faith
terms).
101 Rahman, 578 N.W.2d 802.
102 Callsen, 624 A.2d 663.
103 Id.; Rahman, 578 N.W.2d at 807.
104 Rahman, 578 N.W.2d 802.
'os Id. at 803.
106 Id. at 803-04.
107 Id. at 804.
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sota's Anatomical Gift Act's immunity provision applied and defen-
dants were not liable. 1
08
In Rahman, the organ donation form was filled out by the dece-
dent's father and was not the result of the decedent's registration as an
organ donor, but the case can be analogized to a situation in which a
decedent has registered as a donor. If medical professionals act in
good faith in respecting the organ donor card, that is, if they remove
organs from a decedent for transplantation without first soliciting con-
sent from the decedent's next of kin, Rahman clearly demonstrates
that Minnesota courts would apply the Minnesota Anatomical Gift
Act's immunity provision. 10 9 In Rahman, good faith was constituted
by following a donor card as the physician thought it existed; the phy-
sician thought the card allowed for removing the decedent's organs
for research purposes. 01 Surely, then, good faith could be constituted
by simply adhering to a donor card. Since a finding of good faith is
enough to provide immunity,"' if the next of kin brought suit for the
procurement, summary judgment would be granted in favor of the
medical professionals because there would be no claim for which re-
lief could be granted." 12
Similarly, in Callsen v. Cheltenham York Nursing Home, a Penn-
sylvania court applied and upheld the immunity provision in Pennsyl-
vania's Anatomical Gift Act."13 In Callsen, the decedent's remains
were given to the defendant hospital for medical dissection purposes
without notice to the children of the decedent because the children
could not be located." 4 The children then filed suit."15 The decedent
did not have an organ donor card, but, like Rahman, this case is
analogous to a situation in which there is a donor card because medi-
cal professionals acted in accordance with their state's anatomical gift
act, and, thereby, received immunity under that act."
16
1o' Id. at 806-07.
109 See MINN. STAT. § 525.9221(c) (2005) (providing that medical profession-
als acting in accordance with the applicable anatomical gift law, or attempting in good
faith to do so, are not liable for that act in civil or criminal proceedings).
110 Rahman v. Mayo Clinic, 578 N.W.2d 802, 803-04 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
111 MINN. STAT. § 525.9221(c).
112 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (providing for dismissal for "failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted"); FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (discussing summary
judgment).
113 Callsen v. Cheltenham York Nursing Home, 624 A.2d 663 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1993).
114 Id. at 665.
115 Id. (claiming the defendants' negligent conduct in handling the deceased
person's remains was excessive).
116 See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8607(c) (1994) (current version at 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 8616(c) (1994)) (providing that "a person who acts in good faith in accord
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Although there is no published case where medical professionals'
removal of organs for transplantation from a registered donor resulted
in the donor's next of kin bringing suit for having not been consulted
and having not consented first, Rahman and Callsen provide strong
evidence as to how such a case would be resolved. Those cases indi-
cate that courts are not likely to disregard the statutory immunity pro-
vided by the UAGA for medical professionals.
Despite the willingness of courts to grant immunity to medical
professionals in the context of anatomical gifts, the Alabama Supreme
Court recently deviated from this trend somewhat but only where
there was no donor registration by the decedent."17 In George H.
Lanier Memorial Hospital v. Andrews, 18 the Alabama Supreme Court
imposed liability on a hospital and physicians for removing organs
from a decedent when the decedent's next of kin did not give
unambiguous consent to the donation.19 There, a registered nurse
overheard the decedent's mother express a willingness to donate in a
conversation with another nurse, but a consent form was never signed
by the decedent's mother or father.' 20 Defendants claimed that the
organ removal was conducted because of the belief that the mother
desired to donate the organs, even though the defendants knew there
was not unequivocal consent. '
2
That court did not dismiss the case or grant summary judgment
for the defendants on the grounds that the defendants were immune
from suit under Alabama's Anatomical Gift Act, as prior case law
would suggest. 122 Summary judgment was not granted because the
plaintiffs claimed that they specifically stated that they did not want to
donate the decedent's organs, so the decision as to whether the defen-
dants acted in good faith was contingent upon a factual dispute.
23
Because disputes of facts prevent summary judgment and are for
juries to decide, the case went to a jury, which found the defendants
with ... anatomical gift laws ... is not liable for damages in any civil action or sub-
ject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for his act").117 George H. Lanier Mem'l Hosp. v. Andrews, 901 So. 2d 714 (Ala. 2004).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 722-23.
120 Id. at 717-18, 721.
121 Id. at 718-19.
122 For a similar case where summary judgment was granted for defendants,
see Rahman v. Mayo Clinic, 578 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998), which upheld
summary judgment for clinic and doctors in an action against them seeking damages
for retaining the decedent's pelvic block because the defendants acted in good faith
and made an honest attempt to comply with the decedent's wishes.
123 George H. Lanier Mem'l Hosp. v. Andrews, 901 So. 2d 714, 724-25 (Ala.
2004).
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liable for negligent removal of organs from the decedent because the
defendants erred in believing that the plaintiffs had given consent.1
24
Nevertheless, this case does not show a tendency to deviate from
statutory immunity provided in the UAGA because this court could
not grant immunity since the jury found that the defendants had not
met the provision's criteria of acting in good faith.
25
Furthermore, Lanier does not weaken this Note's claim that medi-
cal professionals should not fear litigation for respecting donor cards
because there was no donor card in that case. In a situation where the
decedent is a registered donor, there would most likely be no question
of good faith for the jury. Therefore, when a donor card is present,
medical professionals will be protected by the UAGA when they re-
move organs without obtaining consent from the next of kin because,
by adhering to the donor card, the physicians have inherently acted in
good faith, as Lanier demonstrated is required to receive protection
through the UAGA's immunity provision.'
26
B. Lack of Standing to Bring a Property Conversion Claim
Additionally, medical professionals are protected because a fam-
ily member does not have standing to bring a conversion of property
claim for the removal of organs from a donor, since the only property
right traditionally recognized in the decedent's next of kin is a burial
right. 27 Most courts have held that "a dead body is not the subject of
property right."'' 28 Hence, property conversion claims brought by de-
cedents' families against medical professionals have been largely un-
successful. 1
29
124 Id. at 719.
'25 Id. at 721-23.
126 Id. at 722-23.
127 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1979); Ann McIntosh,
Comment, Regulating the "Gift of Life": The 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 65
WASH. L. REv. 171, 181-82 (1990) (providing additional commentary on how prop-
erty rights of a decedent's body have been traditionally conferred on the decedent's
surviving next of kin).
1 Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 791 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
Bessemer Land & Improvement Co. v. Jenkins, 18 So. 565, 567 (Ala. 1895)) (dis-
cussing the traditional property right in a decedent being only a right to burial).
129 See Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 865 F. Supp. 724, 726 (Kan.
1994) (articulating Kansas's common law that a property right is recognized in the
body of the decedent only so far as that "the next of kin has a property right to possess
the dead body of a relative for purposes of preserving and burying it"); see also Bauer
v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr., 527 S.E.2d 240 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding dismissal of
action for removal of appellant's deceased husband's eyes against appellant's
wishes).
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Courts have consistently held that a family's property right "en-
compasses only the power to ensure that the corpse is orderly handled
and laid to rest, [but] nothing more."' 130 This right has been referred to
as a "quasi-property" right, which does not confer property and is a
very broad assignment of property rights in the traditional sense.'
3 1
Instead, the term "property," in this context, is used for convenience
in referring to the mere right to ensure a proper burial.
32
Considering this view of property, a family is unlikely to prevail
in an action against medical professionals for removing organs in
good faith on property conversion grounds. Newman v.
Sathyavaglswaran133 is the only reported case where medical profes-
sionals were held liable on such grounds, and in that case the dece-
dents were minors and did not have organ donor cards. 34 Therefore,
that case does not have much effect on a situation where the decedent
is a registered donor. Furthermore, the Newman holding comes from
the controversial Ninth Circuit,' 35 and its dissent, stating that "there is
no property in a dead body," 136 is the more popular view.' 37 There-
fore, physicians should not fear property conversion-based litigation
for harvesting organs from registered organ donors, and the wishes of
such donors should be respected.
130 Bauer, 527 S.E.2d at 244.
131 Id.; Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 237,
242-43 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining how New York is in alignment with other juris-
dictions in their view that quasi-property rights exist for family of the deceased only
to ensure the body is properly laid to rest).
132 Colavito, 356 F. Supp. at 243. See Newman, 287 F.3d at 800 (Fernandez,
J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]o the extent that any right exists, it is, in general,
merely a right to possession," and "that right exists solely for the limited purpose of
determining who shall have its custody for burial" (quoting Sinai Temple v. Kaplan,
127 Cal. Rptr. 80, 85 (1976) (citation omitted))).
133 Newman, 287 F. 3d 786.
134 Id. at 795-97 (holding that parents had a property interest in the corneas of
their deceased children who were not registered organ donors).
135 See Carolyn Lochhead, Congress Moves to Divide Controversial Ninth
Circuit Court: Western Judges Ruled Pledge Unconstitutional, S. F. CHRON., July 24,
2002, at A6 (stating that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals "has a reputation for
issuing inconsistent decisions and unpredictable precedents that are frequently over-
turned bythe Supreme Court").
1 Newman, 287 F.3d at 800 (Fernandez, J., dissenting) (citing Enos v.
Snyder, 63 P. 170, 171 (Cal. 1900)).
137 Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr., 527 S.E.2d 240, 244 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999);
Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 237, 243 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
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C. Inadequate Grounds for an Emotional Distress Claim
Another claim decedents' next of kin may consider bringing
against medical professionals for removal of organs without familial
consent is an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. This
tort claim allows recovery for emotional injuries intentionally caused
by the defendant, despite the absence of physical injury. 138 Like a
property conversion claim, however, this claim lacks merit in an organ
donor case because the elements cannot be proven. Hence, a medical
professional should not refrain from respecting donor cards out of fear
that an emotional distress claim will be brought.
In order to prevail in an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim, the defendant must have caused severe emotional distress to the
plaintiff by outrageous and extreme conduct. 139 Furthermore, the con-
duct must have been intended by the defendant to cause severe
emotional distress, or the defendant must have acted with reckless
disregard to the victim's emotional state. 40
Most states do not require that the plaintiff suffer physical mani-
festations of distress, so that lessens the burden for a family member
bringing an emotional distress claim.14 1 Meeting the requirement of
"outrageous" or "extreme" behavior, though, would be an obstacle
because such behavior has been defined as conduct that is "beyond all
possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious, and ut-
terly intolerable in a civilized community."' 142 Removing organs from
a registered organ donor for the transplantation into a desperate donee
can hardly be labeled as such. Moreover, it would be difficult to say
that a physician intentionally or recklessly inflicted the emotional
distress.
Additionally, the Restatement of Torts requires that a third person
claiming to suffer emotional distress must have been present at the
time of the outrageous and extreme conduct. 143 Because the person at
whom the outrageous and extreme conduct was directed would be the
decedent, the next of kin attempting to bring this claim would be a
third person. Therefore, the family member bringing the emotional
distress claim would have had to have been present when the suppos-
138 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
139 Id.
140 Id. at cmt. i (stating that recklessness is sufficient for intent).
141 See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 286
(Cal. 1952) (discussing the arguments made for permitting causes of action in torts
cases based on mental rather than physical injury, and taking the position that a jury is
in the best position to decide the existence and severity of the mental injury).
142 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d.
143 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46.
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edly "outrageous" conduct occurred, that is, when the organs were
procured. That requirement would make it virtually impossible for this
claim to be brought because it is almost certain that the family mem-
ber would not be present for the removal of organs from the dece-
dent.'
44
On the other hand, the Restatement states in a comment that the
limitation allowing recovery only for plaintiffs present at the time is in
place simply to fulfill "the practical necessity of drawing the line
somewhere."'' 45 The comment goes further to assert that the require-
ment "is intended, however, to leave open the possibility of situations
in which the presence at the time may not be required.' '146 That con-
sideration, however, does not appear to make an emotional distress
claim by a family member any more apt to be successful since the
standards to prove the other elements of the claim---outrageousness
and extremity, as well as intent or recklessness-are so high. Conse-
quently, elements of an emotional distress claim cannot be met, and
there is no legitimate claim that can be brought on these grounds.
As this Part explains, the medical profession should not fear a
lawsuit from decedents' next of kin for harvesting organs without the
next of kin's consent. The immunity provisions in states' anatomical
gift acts provide almost complete protection for medical professionals
by only requiring that the actions be in good faith. Moreover, there are
no adequate grounds for a family member to bring a property conver-
sion or intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Hence, medi-
cal professionals' fears of lawsuit should be alleviated, and these
excuses for disregarding donor cards are unfounded.
47
V. MORAL OBLIGATION TO RESPECT DONORS'
AUTONOMY
Society has traditionally placed a great amount of emphasis on in-
dividual autonomy, and, thus, autonomy should be a factor in the or-
gan donation context. 48 Over the years, it has become increasingly
144 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. 1 (Thus far, liability has been
limited "to plaintiffs who were present at the time, as distinguished from those who
discover later what has occurred.").
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 It should also be noted that a suit on behalf of the decedent would be
unlikely because the only claim would be battery, and, because battery is an
unconsented-to touching, the claim would be without merit since the decedent con-
sented to the touching by registering as an organ donor. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 13 cmt. c.
148 GARRISON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 27.
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important to people that they have control over their own bodies. 149
Bioethicists believe that autonomy is a fundamental principle, and its
significance has been demonstrated through the rise of informed
consent requirements 150 and the use of advance directives.15" ' Conse-
quently, it is immoral to disregard the much-valued standard of auton-
omy in the context of organ donation.
A. Definition and Place in Bioethics
The principle of autonomy provides another basis for respecting a
donor's wishes, though this basis is grounded in morality and societal
consensus rather than in the law. Autonomy is considered a funda-
mental principle in American bioethics and refers to individualism,
including a right to make determinations regarding one's own body.
52
Medical ethics, as expressed in leading bioethics books, has adopted
autonomy as one of the key dominating principles that "should always
be respected unless some strong countervailing reason exists to justify
overruling" it.'53 Autonomy is viewed as "consistent with the individ-
ual temper of American life, which emphasizes privacy and self-
determination."' 154 Hence, society, as well as the medical profession,
has come to place a great deal of emphasis on the importance of de-
ciding how one's own body shall be cared for and treated.
As a dominating and valued ideal in American culture, autonomy
in health care decision making has benefits including the following:
149 Robert M. Veach & Daniel Callahan, Is Autonomy an Outmoded Value?,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1984, at 38, 38 (discussing the history of how "the pa-
tient as a dignified agent free to participate in and exercise self-determination over
medical decisions" has come to be the dominant view in society today).
150 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780-81 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (drawing
from several academic sources, the court created the doctrine of informed consent to
bring medical practice up to date with society's goal of autonomy and self-
determination).
151 See, e.g., Klavan v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 60 F. Supp. 2d 436, 440
(E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that someone in a persistent vegetative state, who had an
advance directive stating that he did not wish to be kept alive under such circum-
stances, should be allowed to die because the patient has a protected liberty interest in
the autonomous decision to refuse medical treatment); see also UNIF. HEALTH-CARE
DECISIONS ACT § 2 (1993) (This Act, adopted by many states, allows a person to give
instructions as to what his or her health care treatment should be if he or she becomes
unable to make such decisions.).
152 GARRISON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 27; THE NEW AMERICAN
WEBSTER HANDY COLLEGE DICTIONARY 55 (Albert Morehead & Loy Morehead eds.,
Penguin Group 1995) (1951).
153 Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Metamorphosis of Medical Ethics: A 30-Year
Perspective, 269 JAMA 1158, 1160 (1993).
154 id.
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First, the principle encourages better health because patients
may make better decisions for themselves than others can
make for them. Second, the principle contributes to the regu-
lation of medicine as a profession and an enterprise because it
exposes medicine's decisions to inspection and cabins medi-
cine's power to impose its will. Third, the principle helps pa-
tients realize what they want---control-and achieve it.
Fourth, the principle helps patients reap the moral advantages
that accrue to people who take responsibility and authority for
their own lives.
1 55
Furthermore, a vast number of bioethicists endorse the idea of
autonomy as a moral duty imposed upon medical professionals. 156 The
consensus of society and of bioethicists appears to be that physicians
should allow competent patients to make their own decisions or at
least assume a great amount of responsibility in making their health
care decisions. 57 The benefits and individualism that result have dis-
tinguished autonomy as a major factor in medicine today.
B. Application to Organ Donation
Because the principle of autonomy is so highly prized in United
States culture, religion, and professional standards, it is important to
respect it in the context of organ donation just as much as in any other
medical decision.158 The self-determination of individuals would be
destroyed if a deceased donor's gift is rejected because of a lack of
consent by the decedent's next of kin. A family member's demand
that organs not be procured from a registered organ donor improperly
trumps what should be an autonomous decision by the deceased.
159
Considering society's emphasis on autonomy, it is unethical to allow a
next of kin's decision to take precedence over what the decedent has
determined should be the fate of his or her own body. Hence, medical
155 GARRISON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 146-47.
156 Id.
157 See generally E. HAAVI MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEW MEDICAL
ETHICS OF MEDICINE'S NEW ECONOMICS (1995) (using the changing norm of patients
being responsible for their own health care as a basis for a variety of economic argu-
ments).
158 Bucklin, supra note 10, at 349; Theresa J. Shafer et al., EthicalAnalysis of
Organ Recovery Denials by Medical Examiners, Coroners, and Justices of the Peace,
9 J. TRANSPLANT COORDINATION 232, 239 (1999).
159 Candice Cummins Gauthier, Philosophical Foundation of Respect for
Autonomy, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 21, 22 (1993).
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professionals should feel morally obligated to respect the autonomy of
the decedent and give deference to an organ donor card.
Medical professionals continue adherence to autonomy to the
greatest extent possible in contexts other than that of organ donation,
making clear their deference to the principle. The issue of informed
consent and use of advance directives, for example, conform to the
idea that a patient has the right to make decisions regarding his or her
own body.160 It is morally inconsistent, then, not to place a similar
importance on self-determination in the context of organ donation.
Informed consent has come to mean that medical professionals
have an obligation to give patients all information about their condi-
tion that a reasonable patient would want to know.'16 Medical profes-
sionals are required to lay out the various treatment options and to
allow patients to make their own decisions with full knowledge of the
facts. 162 Similarly, an organ donor has made an informed decision
about the fate of his or her own body. Registering as an organ donor is
exercising one's right to self-determination, and it is unethical for
medical professionals to ignore such a decision.
Additionally, the use of advance directives can be analogized to
the organ procurement context. Do-not-resuscitate orders, living wills,
and appointments of surrogate decision makers are based on the im-
portance of an autonomous individual, able to make his or her own
decisions about health care. Such decisions are routine and often
statutorily supported. 163 The Illinois legislature, for one, has explicitly
promoted autonomy in stating that "[t]he legislature recognizes that
all persons have a fundamental right to make decisions relating to
their own medical treatment.' 64 Surely, this right also applies to the
decision whether to donate one's organs upon death.
160 GARRISON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 316 (stating that "[tihe princi-
ple motive for advance directives has been the hope that they would promote patients'
autonomy").
161 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (finding that
physicians are a type of fiduciary and that they have a duty to disclose all relevant
information to patients so that patients can make informed decisions about their own
health care).
'62 Id. at 782-83.
161 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2960 (Consol. 2006) (titled "Orders Not to
Resuscitate" and granting the right to create an order not to administer cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation if a person desires); UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 2 (1993)
(allowing a person to give instructions as to what his or her health care treatment
should be if he or she becomes unable to make such decisions).
164 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/5-5(a) (2005); see 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1
(2005).
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Medical professionals do not tend to ignore an individual's wishes
in favor of a family member's in the advance directive context, as
they do in the organ donation context, because courts will not allow
them to do so. For instance, when a patient in a persistent vegetative
state has an advance directive indicating that he or she does not wish
to be kept alive in such circumstances, physicians may attempt to keep
that person alive, perhaps for their own reasons or perhaps to avoid
suit from family members, but courts are reluctant to refuse to uphold
advance directives made by competent individuals. 1
65
Similarly, courts will not allow autonomous decisions to be over-
ridden in the informed consent context. Except in a few exceptional
circumstances,166 medical professionals are not allowed to act in ac-
cordance with a family member's desire for a procedure to take place
unless the patient consented. 67 For example, in a case where a woman
had a gangrenous leg and would die if the leg was not amputated, a
Massachusetts court held that the woman did not have to comply with
her adult children's insistence that she have the amputation.1 68 The
court held that she competently made an autonomous decision to re-
fuse treatment, so the decision should be respected. 69 That case dem-
onstrates that a physician cannot proceed with a procedure different
than that to which the patient consented simply due to the patient's
161 In re Janet S., 712 N.E.2d 422 (1999) (reversing an order that required the
involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs because the petition seeking the
order did not allege there had been a good faith effort made to determine whether the
patient had executed an advance directive for health care, thus, demonstrating that an
advance directive would prevail).
166 These exceptions include circumstances when the patient does not have
the capacity to consent, circumstances where informing the patient would ultimately
cause more harm, circumstances that qualify as an emergency; circumstances in
which treatment is mandatory; and circumstances in which the patient has waived his
or her right to informed consent. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788-89 (stating circum-
stances under which informed consent does not have to be obtained from a patient).
167 Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1235-36 (Mass. Ct. App. 1978)
(holding that a patient cannot be rendered legally incompetent only because his or her
decision concerning care may result in death). Even in situations involving children,
courts have given a great deal of deference to the child's decision about his or her
own medical treatment. In a situation where the child's decision would be a healthier
choice than what that child's parent desires, courts will act in accord with the child's
decision. This comes up in the context of when parents are Jehovah's Witnesses, and,
therefore, refuse to allow their child to have a blood transfusion. Although courts are
not in agreement as to whether to force the transfusion if the child agrees with the
parents that a transfusion should not be given, courts do agree that the transfusion
should take place if the child disagrees with the parents and desires the transfusion. In
re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 392 (Pa. 1972).
168 Lane, 376 N.E.2d at 1235-36.
169 Id.
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family's requests. It would seem, then, that such action should not be
allowed in the organ donation context either.
It is debatable to what extent a deceased person actually has an
autonomy interest, and, therefore, to what extent these analogies are
applicable to this Note's overall argument. It is not clear that the de-
ceased can reap all the benefits of autonomy that serve as bases for
supporting the theory of autonomy in health care decision making. For
instance, making the decision to be an organ donor does not appear to
encourage better health for the individual on the grounds that indi-
viduals can make better decisions for themselves than others can make
for them. Whether a person is an organ donor does not have any im-
pact on his or her health. It is unlikely that a person would decide to
live a healthier lifestyle in order to have healthier organs to donate
after death. In other words, making the choice to be an organ donor is
not making a decision impacting one's own health.
On the other hand, control over one's own body is also a main
purpose of autonomy in medical decision making.1 70 Certainly, most
would expect that this control would not end with death if they had
left specific instructions as to how their bodies should be handled.
Furthermore, having a mandatory instruction to harvest organs upon
death would "cabin[] medicine's power to impose its will," which is
an additional asserted benefit of autonomy. 71 Hence, some of the
advantages of autonomy exist even when a person is no longer alive,
and, therefore, it would seem that the deceased still has an autonomy
interest, at least in the organ donation context.
Accordingly, reverence for individual autonomy should logically
flow to the organ donation setting. Thus, respecting organ donor regis-
trations seems to be the only morally acceptable action.
CONCLUSION
It is easy to understand that families would want to have a say in
what happens to their loved ones' bodies. After all, the next of kin's
burial right, as discussed in Part IV B., could arguably include the
right to bury the deceased's entire body. Furthermore, many people
believe that their religion prohibits organ donation.172 For instance, a
170 See GARRISON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 146-47; Wayne Shelton,
Respect for Donor Autonomy and the Dead Donor Rule, 3 AM. J. BIOETHIcs 20, 20
(2003) (advocating that individuals should be able to "donate organs based on their
autonomous wishes").
171 GARRISON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 147; see Shelton, supra note
170.
172 Kathie Kroot, A Jewish Perspective on Organ Transplantation,
TRANSWEB.ORG, May 11, 2000, http://www.transweb.org/reference/articles/religion/
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study in one Jewish community found that a large number of respon-
dents believed that Jewish law prohibits organ donation, even though
this is not actually true.173 In actuality, all major religions-
Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and Sikhism-
support organ donation and transplantation because relieving suffering
and saving lives are central components of those faiths.
74
Medical professionals are in a sticky situation because they are
probably simply following hospital protocol by asking for permission
from the deceased's family to procure organs.175 It should be remem-
bered, however, that there is no reported case where a deceased was a
registered donor, organs were procured from that donor, and the fam-
ily sued because of the procurement. Therefore, medical professionals
should perhaps push for a change in hospital protocol.
This Note has argued that organ donor cards should be respected
and that the all-too-often occurrence of medical professionals allow-
ing a deceased organ donor's next of kin to have veto power over ana-
tomical donation is illegal and immoral. The illegality stems from
statutory provisions in state anatomical gift acts and from breach of
contract. In making this case, this Note further argues that there is no
successful cause of action that can be brought against medical profes-
sionals for respecting organ donor cards, and, therefore, there is no
legitimate reason why organ donors' wishes should ever be trumped
by the decedent's next of kin. Lastly, beyond the legality of this issue
lies an ethical question of whether it is morally wrong not to procure
organs from a registered organ donor. Considering the emphasis that
society today places on individual autonomy in all areas of life and
especially in the medical setting, it appears clear that the moral course
of action is to respect the wishes of the decedent. Allowing familial
veto power over a decedent's wish to be an organ donor is, for all the
reasons set forth here, a practice that should cease. In respecting organ
donor registrations, medical professionals should have no fear of law-
suits and should take comfort in the morality of their actions.
shalomarticle.html (explaining that organ donation is allowed in the Jewish religion).
173 Id.
114 BBC Health, DoNation Journey, http://www.bbc.co.uk/health/donation/
nonflashjourney*religions.shtml (last visited Sept. 17, 2006) (stating that "all the
major religions of the UK support organ donation and transplantation" and discussing
the different schools of thought on this issue).
175 See McKenny & Parker, supra note 30, at 974.

